University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2007

Congressional Power to Extend Preclearance: A
Response to Professor Karlan
Ellen D. Katz
University of Michigan Law School, ekatz@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1051

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Election
Law Commons, Law and Race Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Supreme Court of the
United States Commons
Recommended Citation
Katz, Ellen D. "Congressional Power to Extend Preclearance: A Response to Professor Karlan." Hous. L. Rev. 44, no. 1 (2007): 33-63.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

(2)KATZ.DOC

3/20/2007 4:08 PM

COMMENTARY
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO EXTEND
PRECLEARANCE: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR KARLAN
Ellen D. Katz*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................33

II. A PLENARY POWER?................................................................39
A. Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications .........39
B. The Regulation of Congressional Elections ....................46
C. “Political Value Judgments” ...........................................47
D. Exercising “Political Responsibility” ..............................50
III. A THIRD APPROACH ................................................................52
A. Reauthorizing Existing Statutes Under City of Boerne ....53
B. The Centrality of Bailout...................................................56
IV. CONCLUSION ...........................................................................62
I.

INTRODUCTION

Is the core provision of the Voting Rights Act
unconstitutional? Many people now think that the Act’s
preclearance requirement is invalid, but Professor Karlan is not
among them. In part, that is because she is not convinced the
problems that originally motivated Congress to impose
preclearance have been fully remedied. Professor Karlan points
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Emma Cheuse,
Daniel Halberstam, Bill Miller, Rick Pildes, and Dan Tokaji for helpful comments and
suggestions, and to Jim Driscoll-MacEachron for research assistance.
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out the many ways section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)
shapes behavior in the jurisdictions subject to the statute—not
just by blocking discriminatory electoral changes, but also by
influencing less transparent conduct by various political actors
operating in these regions. Do not be so sure, she tells us, that
opportunities for minority political participation would not
deteriorate absent the constraints imposed by section 5.1
I share that sentiment, although Professor Karlan and I
differ on how it informs the legality of reauthorization. For
Professor Karlan, what matters is that Congress thought that
minority political participation in covered jurisdictions would
2
suffer were the statute to expire. When a legal challenge to
reauthorization makes its way to the Supreme Court, as one
inevitably will, Professor Karlan maintains that the Justices
should simply defer to Congress’s judgment that section 5
remains necessary. She writes, “Congress should have the
authority . . . to conclude that the course of treatment is not yet
fully complete and to prescribe another round of medicine.”3
Professor Karlan, of course, knows that the Supreme Court
accorded Congress no such deference in City of Boerne v. Flores
and the five related decisions that followed. Decided between
1997 and 2001, City of Boerne and its progeny struck down
portions of six federal statutes and flatly rejected Congress’s
judgment that particular statutory remedies were needed. In
each case, the Court found that Congress failed to document
constitutional violations pervasive enough to warrant the federal
4
proscriptions and remedies it attempted to construct. As a
result, it is widely assumed that the fate of section 5, as
reauthorized, will hinge on whether the record Congress amassed
to support reauthorization documents the continuance of
pervasive, or at least significant, unconstitutional conduct for
which preclearance offers a remedy.5
1. See Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and
Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 22 (2007).
2. See id. at 29.
3. Id. at 31.
4. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530–32 (1997); see also Bd. of Trs. of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 614–19 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88–91 (2000); Coll. Sav.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672–75 (1999); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640–47
(1999).
5. See Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South? Regional Variation and Political
Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in DEMOCRACY, P ARTICIPATION AND
P OWER: P ERSPECTIVES ON REAUTHORIZATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (forthcoming
2007) (manuscript at 2 n.6, on file with the Houston Law Review), available at
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Professor Karlan disputes that assumption. She argues that
preclearance differs from the statutes invalidated in the City of
Boerne decisions because it implicates five critical factors—a
fundamental right, a suspect classification, the regulation of
congressional elections, the need for “political value judgments,”
6
and the exercise of “political responsibility.” Professor Karlan
posits that these factors are all “in play with respect to the
preclearance regime,” that their convergence places congressional
power “at its apogee,” rendering the limits on Congress
7
articulated in City of Boerne and its progeny inapplicable.
That is a provocative and novel defense of reauthorization.
The standard line insists that preclearance comports with the
City of Boerne standard, either in its most rigorous form, or
under the less exacting version applied in two more recent
decisions which involved suspect classes and fundamental
8
rights. Preclearance, of course, implicates both race, a suspect
classification, and voting, the classic fundamental right.
Professor Karlan relies on these aspects of section 5 as important
to its survival. But her claim is not that these specific features of
section 5 mean that preclearance should be subject to some sort
of watered down City of Boerne review. Far more sweeping, her
claim is that the statute need not be subject to the City of Boerne
analysis at all. Congress need not document pervasive,
significant, or even any unconstitutional conduct in covered
jurisdictions because when it acts as it did in this realm, it
exercises what I understand Professor Karlan to suggest is a
plenary power—or at least pretty close to one.
Professor Karlan skillfully presents this robust vision of
congressional power. She cogently reconciles existing precedent
and adroitly extracts every morsel of support one can from the
legal landscape to bolster her argument. And yet, I am not
convinced. On both descriptive and normative grounds, I am not
convinced that Congress enjoys, or should enjoy, as much power
as she suggests, and, as a predictive matter, I would be surprised
if a majority of the Roberts Court will think so either. Professor
Karlan’s vision of congressional power supports not only section 5
as reauthorized, but also a far more expansive statute, one with
neither temporal nor geographic limitations, one unsupported by
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=955827.
6. Karlan, supra note 1, at 17–19.
7. Id. at 17.
8. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522–23 (2004); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res.
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003); see also Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and Bailout
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Are Still a Constitutionally Proportional Remedy, 28
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 69, 71 (2003).
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a record of any kind, and one stripped of the bailout provision,
the escape hatch that presently releases covered jurisdictions
from preclearance if they comply with specified statutory criteria.
Given the skepticism many Justices have expressed about
various aspects of the Voting Rights Act, I suspect that a
majority of them will not embrace such a vision.
Still, as I have written elsewhere,9 I too think the legality of
reauthorization should not hinge on the record of
unconstitutional conduct the Court demanded in City of Boerne
and its progeny. In my view, it is not the five factors that
Professor Karlan cites that make section 5 different, but instead
section 5’s status as an operational statute, and not a wholly new
one. The City of Boerne decisions required evidence of pervasive
unconstitutional conduct in order to ensure that the problem
Congress sought to address was significant enough to warrant a
new congressional statute.10 Had Congress expanded the
preclearance regime to apply to regions where section 5 presently
does not operate, City of Boerne’s quest for pervasive
unconstitutional conduct might govern the validity of that
expansion.
Reauthorization of an existing statute like section 5,
however, requires a different showing. Section 5 was legitimately
put in place more than forty years ago to address precisely the
type of pervasive discrimination the City of Boerne cases require
as justification for new legislation. For the validity of
reauthorization to depend on evidence that such discrimination
persists largely unchanged would mean that preclearance could
be reauthorized only if the statute was wholly ineffective. In
other words, section 5’s very success in addressing racial
discrimination in voting should not itself be mistaken for proof
that preclearance has become obsolete.11
Nor, however, should section 5’s success be license for the
statute to continue indefinitely. Instead, the validity of
reauthorization should depend on whether section 5 has achieved
its goals not only to suppress acts of racial discrimination in
voting, but to bring about lasting changes in behavior and
attitude as well. It should require that we try to predict whether
unconstitutional conduct would resume were the constraints of
section 5 lifted. Reauthorization should require that we
determine whether section 5’s success in controlling

9.
10.
11.

See Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 20).
See supra note 4.
See Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 2).
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manifestations of racial discrimination now amounts to a cure for
the underlying disease.12
Critics of reauthorization insist that we have been cured.
Observed improvements in minority political participation
suggest that may be right, but these improvements are also, as
Professor Karlan rightly notes, consistent with the view that
section 5 is curbing misconduct that might otherwise find
13
expression. Professor Karlan argues for plenary power in part
because she believes the evidence on the ground supports both a
“realist” account and the more “optimistic” story critics of
reauthorization celebrate. Because Congress opted for realism,
14
she argues, the Court should not displace it.
I am nevertheless wary of an approach that renders
reauthorization functionally unreviewable. City of Boerne and its
progeny, while problematic in important respects, were
nevertheless properly animated by the conviction that
congressional
power
to
enforce
the
Reconstruction
Amendments—including Congress’s power to reauthorize section
5—is not wholly unfettered. The Roberts Court will undoubtedly
assess reauthorization under the City of Boerne standard,
requiring congruence and proportionality between the statutory
provision and the injury addressed, and indeed it should. My
view, however, is that when it does, it must adjust the City of
Boerne standard to reflect section 5’s status as an operational
statute.
More specifically, the validity of section 5 cannot hinge on
the scope of contemporary unconstitutional conduct in covered
jurisdictions, given that section 5 presently operates to block
such conduct.15 Instead, reauthorization is best understood to
target political processes that continue to be compromised by
race, compromised in ways that reflect past unconstitutional
conduct and portend future misconduct absent the strictures of
section 5. As I will explain, such practices are a legitimate target
for congressional enforcement legislation. The Court has
specifically so held in the past and explicitly affirmed in City of
Boerne itself.16

12. See Karlan, supra note 1, at 31; see also Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 21)
(questioning “whether Section 5 has successfully achieved its larger ambition not simply
to suppress discrimination in voting but to change the attitudes that, if left unchecked,
give rise to the behavior”).
13. Karlan, supra note 1, at 21–22.
14. Id. at 30.
15. See id. at 22.
16. See infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
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To be sure, understanding reauthorization to target political
processes of this sort presents a serious problem if congressional
power is to remain at all circumscribed. Race will very likely
always affect political processes in problematic ways and the
prospect of future misconduct will never fully abate. How then
should we gauge Congress’s determination that preclearance
remains necessary in covered jurisdictions at this moment
without unavoidably upholding congressional power to deem it
necessary in perpetuity, to expand its reach geographically or to
heighten the burdens it imposes?
The best answer has been provided by Congress itself. In the
reauthorized statute, Congress articulated a standard to gauge
17
when preclearance is no longer necessary. That standard, set
forth in the statute’s bailout provision, does not require the
elimination of every way race compromises political processes in
covered jurisdictions. Nor does it demand the elimination of any
threat of future misconduct. Instead, it articulates criteria
compliance with which Congress has deemed proof the
jurisdiction has made sufficient progress to be relieved of further
obligations under section 5.18
While Congress designed the bailout criteria for application
on a case-by-case basis, it implicitly applied the standard
wholesale when it recently reauthorized section 5.
Reauthorization reflects Congress’s judgment that preclearance
remains necessary and, by implication, that covered jurisdictions
were not categorically qualified for bailout at the time of renewal.
The record evidence Congress collected prior to reauthorization
indeed suggests widespread noncompliance with the bailout
factors.19
Congress nevertheless left room for the possibility that
covered jurisdictions might demonstrate otherwise and show that
they made sufficient progress to be released from coverage, now
or in the coming years. In other words, the bailout provision
enables covered jurisdictions to calibrate on an individual basis
Congress’s judgment that, overall, section 5 remains necessary.
Bailout thereby clarifies the regime reauthorization imposes.
Rather than an inexorable command, preclearance operates as a
rebuttable presumption that covered jurisdictions may refute.
The question of whether to reauthorize preclearance forced
Congress to confront a difficult counterfactual: what would

17.
18.
19.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(F) (2000).
Id.
See S. Res. 232, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. S9541 (2005).
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happen if the strictures of section 5 were lifted? Sufficient
evidence pointed to the conclusion that some ill would occur, but
how much or how pervasive this occurrence would be was
difficult to assess. Faced with this uncertainty, Congress
renewed the statute but limited its reach by specifying
evidentiary criteria that a jurisdiction must satisfy to
demonstrate that it had sufficiently mended its ways, and it left
the burden on the jurisdiction to so demonstrate. In the context
of renewing an existing statute in the face of necessary
uncertainty, this choice, as exercised by Congress, should receive
deference under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. And it
is ultimately this choice that renders reauthorization
constitutional.
***
Part I of this Essay parses the factors Professor Karlan
identifies as characterizing the preclearance regime, which she
claims give rise to distinct congressional power in this realm.
This Part explains why the Roberts Court is likely to read each of
these factors less expansively than does Professor Karlan. Part II
offers an alternative approach through which to explore validity
of reauthorization, one that requires adapting the City of Boerne
framework to accommodate section 5’s status as an operational
statute. Part III concludes this commentary.
II. A PLENARY POWER?
Professor Karlan argues that the preclearance process is
different from the statutes invalidated in the City of Boerne line
of cases in several critical ways, which, when taken together,
placed Congress’s power at its “apogee” when it reauthorized
section 5.20 The Roberts Court may well disagree. Here is why.
A. Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications
Professor Karlan observes that Congress’s power to enforce
the Reconstruction Amendments “is at its strongest” when it
“acts to remedy or prevent the kinds of practices that the Court
has subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny.”21 Congress can do
more, she writes, when it acts to protect a fundamental right or
suspect classification than when it seeks “to promote equality
more generally.”22

20.
21.
22.

Karlan, supra note 1, at 17.
Id. at 13.
Id.
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This position has been widely advanced in the debates that
preceded reauthorization, and the authority most often cited for
it is the authority Professor Karlan invokes—namely, two recent
decisions, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, and
23
Tennessee v. Lane. Hibbs sustained the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) against a Boerne-based challenge, while Lane
upheld a provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
facing a similar attack. Hibbs emphasized that the FMLA
implicated questions of gender discrimination, a subject that
24
receives heightened judicial scrutiny, while Lane pointed out
that the application of the ADA under challenge had protected
access to the courts, and thus implicated a fundamental right.25
Supporters of reauthorization celebrate Hibbs and Lane, but
whether the Roberts Court will embrace these decisions remains
to be seen. Hibbs and Lane are not easily reconciled with the
earlier City of Boerne decisions, some of which involved
challenges to statutes that also implicated fundamental rights
(such as the free exercise of religion in City of Boerne itself) or a
suspect classification (such as gender discrimination in the
United States v. Morrison26 decision striking down the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA)). These earlier decisions elicited no
deference from the Court of the sort the Justices employed in
Hibbs and Lane. While the statutes in these earlier cases might
be distinguished from the FMLA and ADA in terms of their
relative breadth and the type of remedy imposed, the earlier
decisions never suggested that suspect classes or fundamental
rights might matter to the analysis.
Both Hibbs and Lane, moreover, involved fractured opinions,
and the deciding votes were cast by Justices no longer on the
Court (namely, William Rehnquist in Hibbs and Sandra Day
27
O’Connor in Lane). Justice Kennedy, who now holds the Court’s
28
center, dissented in both cases. Thus, even if a majority of the
Rehnquist Court believed that more deference to Congress should
be accorded when legislation implicates fundamental rights and
suspect classifications, a majority of the Roberts Court may not.
Professor Karlan may yet find herself longing for the good old
days of the Rehnquist Court.

23. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522–23 (2004); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728–29 (2003).
24. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728.
25. Lane, 541 U.S. at 521–22.
26. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
27. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 723; Lane, 541 U.S. at 512.
28. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 723; Lane, 541 U.S. at 512.
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Even if Hibbs and Lane remain good law, the decisions do
not suggest a power plenary in scope. While they uphold
congressional enactments based on thinner records than those
deemed inadequate in the original City of Boerne decisions, they
29
hardly repudiate the City of Boerne framework. They continue
to emphasize “the extent and specificity” of the unconstitutional
30
state conduct needed as a predicate for congressional action.
Even absent this precedent, the Court’s careful preservation
of the VRA’s preclearance regime in prior decisions does indeed
suggest special receptivity to congressional power over suspect
classifications and fundamental rights, and specifically to the
very classification and fundamental right preclearance
31
implicates. City of Boerne cites earlier versions of the VRA’s
section 5 as the paradigm of permissible enforcement legislation,
despite both “the burden those measures placed on the States” and
their proscription of constitutional conduct.32 City of Boerne’s
progeny likewise invoke the earlier VRA provisions as examples of
permissible congressional action and cite the decisions upholding
them as so establishing.33
29. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Real Discrimination?, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 97,
118 (2004) (“Together Lane and Hibbs establish that Congress has more authority to act
under Section 5 . . . when it is dealing with claims of discrimination or violations of rights
which receive heightened scrutiny.”). But see Vikram David Amar, The New “New
Federalism”: The Supreme Court in Hibbs (and Guillen), 6 GREEN BAG 2d 349, 351–53
(2003) (arguing that the heightened scrutiny for gender classifications notwithstanding,
Hibbs is irreconcilable with City of Boerne and Morrison).
30. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 733–35 & n.11; see also Lane, 541 U.S. at 528–29 (noting the
“sheer volume of evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of unconstitutional
discrimination” evidenced through “judicial findings of unconstitutional state action, and
statistical, legislative, and anecdotal evidence of the widespread exclusion of persons with
disabilities from the enjoyment of public services”).
31. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001) (contrasting
abrogation of immunity in ADA with the VRA provisions upheld in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626–27 (2000) (contrasting VAWA
with statutory provisions upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach and Katzenbach v.
Morgan); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88–89 (2000) (discussing the
importance of the legislative record); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 638–39 & n.5 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
518 (1997) (citing VRA quartet as examples of permissible enforcement legislation); see
also Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (likening congressional efforts to combat sex discrimination in
the FMLA with the VRA’s attempt to combat racial discrimination in voting, as upheld in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach). The notable exception is City of Boerne’s rejection of
Katzenbach v. Morgan’s suggestion that Congress may expand the rights protected by the
Equal Protection Clause. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527–28.
32. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518.
33. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (citing the VRA provisions upheld in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach as examples of permissible congressional measures to address a serious
problem); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373 (stating that “[t]he ADA’s constitutional shortcomings
are apparent” when compared with the VRA provisions upheld in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (describing VAWA as “unlike” the remedies
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The Court’s post-Boerne decision, Lopez v. Monterey County,
vigorously affirmed the constitutionality of a broad construction
34
of section 5. In Lopez, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion easily
finds “that Congress has the constitutional authority to designate
covered jurisdictions and to guard against changes that give rise
to a discriminatory effect in those jurisdictions.”35 This process
36
may be intrusive, but it falls well within Congress’s enforcement
powers to mandate. “[T]he Voting Rights Act, by its nature,
intrudes on state sovereignty,” Justice O’Connor observed, while
emphasizing that “[t]he Fifteenth Amendment permits this
intrusion.”37 Lopez thereby affirms as constitutionally permissible
the burden that the section 5 preclearance process “by its nature”
38
places on state sovereignty.
While the Court had previously upheld congressional
39
authority to enact section 5, Lopez is important because it
addressed the constitutionality of the statute after the 1982
extension and after the emergence of the City of Boerne
40
framework. Lopez certainly offers support for the claim that
section 5 is entitled to a different form of review than that
employed in the City of Boerne cases. In Lopez, Justice O’Connor
cites City of Boerne only once, and then solely for the proposition
that Congress’s enforcement power includes the power to prohibit
constitutional conduct and to intrude deeply into state sovereign

upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan and South Carolina v. Katzenbach); Kimel, 528 U.S. at
89 (contrasting the congressional record supporting ADEA’s abrogation of state immunity
with that underlying the VRA provisions upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach); Fla.
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 638–39 & n.5 (invoking City of Boerne’s discussion of the VRA
quartet to distinguish the statutory provision in dispute).
34. Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282–85 (1999); see also John Matthew
Guard, Comment, “Impotent Figureheads”? State Sovereignty, Federalism, and the
Constitutionality of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act After Lopez v. Monterey County and
City of Boerne v. Flores, 74 TUL. L. REV. 329, 355–56 (1999).
35. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 283.
36. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don’t Have to Be Liberal to Hate the Racial
Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779, 790 (1998) (describing preclearance process
as “an unprecedented federal intrusion into the governing processes of the states”).
37. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 284–85.
38. Id. at 284. Lopez, in fact, references not just section 5 but the Voting Rights Act
in its entirety. Id.
39. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183 (1980); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966); see also Guard, supra note 34, at 357 (arguing that
principles of stare decisis support the Court’s holding in Lopez).
40. Lopez was decided during the same term as the College Savings Bank and
Florida Prepaid decisions, both of which developed and extended the City of Boerne
decision. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 672 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 637–40 (1999).
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processes.41 Lopez, moreover, makes no mention of the
congressional findings underlying the 1982 extension of section 5.
Instead, Justice O’Connor affirms the validity of section 5 based
on South Carolina v. Katzenbach and City of Rome v. United
States, both of which upheld earlier versions of the statute based
on distinct legislative findings and historic circumstances.42
The Justices in Lopez were remarkably united in thinking
section 5 legitimate. Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined not
only by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, all of
whom dissented in City of Boerne’s progeny,43 but also by Justice
Scalia, who voted with the majority in all of the City of Boerne
44
decisions and dissented in both Hibbs and Lane. So too, while
former Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy concurred
in Lopez, they did so to dispute a factual issue and a specific
application of section 5, and not to question the overall validity of
the statute.45 Even Justice Thomas, who dissented alone and
argued that the Court’s construction of section 5 contravened the
46
City of Boerne standard, did not suggest that section 5 itself, as
amended in 1982, was suspect under the City of Boerne doctrine.
Lopez’s affirmation of section 5 was not, accordingly, the product
of a divided Court.
The Roberts Court also appears to subscribe to the
proposition that section 5 is legally permissible, at least insofar
41. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 282–83 (“As the Court recently observed with respect to
Congress’s power to legislate under the Fourteenth Amendment, ‘[l]egislation which
deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’s
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself
unconstitutional and intrudes into legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to
the States.’” (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997)) (alteration in
original).
42. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 282–84; see also City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 180–82
(discussing congressional findings supporting the 1975 extension of the Act and agreeing
that the need for the extension was “unsurprising and unassailable” and that it was
“plainly a constitutional method of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment”); South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308–09 (noting extensive congressional findings underlying the
1965 VRA).
43. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 655 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part); Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 693
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. Justice O’Connor likewise joined the majority in City of Boerne’s progeny, but
dissented in City of Boerne itself because of her disagreement with the Court’s analysis in
Employment Division v. Smith. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 544–45 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
45. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 288 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46. See id. at 295–96 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that nondiscretionary actions
cannot be motivated by unconstitutional conduct and accordingly that Congress cannot reach
them through enforcement legislation).
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as it was reauthorized in 1982. In last year’s League of United
Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, Justice Scalia
characterized the state’s interest in complying with section 5 as
compelling. Justice Scalia stated that this compelling interest
justified, under strict scrutiny, what he deemed to be an
intentional racial gerrymander.47 Joining Justice Scalia on this
point were Justices Thomas and Alito, and Chief Justice
Roberts.48 Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer had all
previously stated their belief that compliance with section 5, as
49
amended in 1982, is a compelling state interest. As a result,
Justice Kennedy is now the only sitting Justice who has not
expressly subscribed to that proposition.
All told, these decisions provide substantial support for the
proposition that Congress has additional power when it regulates
at least one suspect classification and at least one fundamental
right. That is, these decisions suggest that congressional power
to regulate the intersection of race and the right to vote is simply
different. I have written elsewhere that such a rule makes sense,
and in fact comports with a meaningful commitment to
federalism and state power. In particular, I think that the Court
has historically deferred to congressional power in the realm of
race and the vote in order to reinforce representative governance
at the state and local level. The animating conviction is that state
and local governments best protect individual liberty, but this
conviction is informed by the belief that to do their jobs such
governments must be democratically accountable. Seen in this
light, intrusive federal measures like section 5 are permissible
because they are thought to foster effective state and local

47. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594,
2666–67 (2006); see also Nathaniel Persily, Strict in Theory, Loopy in Fact, 105 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 43 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/
vol105/persily.pdf.
48. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2663.
49. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996). (“We assume, arguendo, for the purpose
of resolving this suit, that compliance with § 2 could be a compelling interest . . . .”); see
also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e assume without
deciding that compliance with the [section 2] results test . . . can be a compelling state
interest”); id. at 990–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that “compliance with the
results test of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) is a compelling state interest”); id. at
1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that “[e]ven if strict scrutiny applies, I would find
these districts constitutional, for each considers race only to the extent necessary to
comply with the State’s responsibilities under the Voting Rights Act while achieving other
race-neutral political and geographical requirements”); id. at 1046 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(describing as significant Justice O’Connor’s concurring position “that compliance with § 2
of the Voting Rights Act is a compelling state interest”).
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governance and thereby to render unnecessary even more
intrusive and extensive federal regulation.50
This suggests that the Court might well think that section 5,
as reauthorized in 2006, is no different from the earlier versions
of the statute. The Court might review it with the same
deferential stance the Justices employed previously. Still, the
Court may think the most recent reauthorization presents a
distinct issue. In the City of Boerne decisions the Court had little
difficulty affirming the validity of section 5, a historically
51
resonant statute that was not subject to direct challenge. So too,
Lopez involved a relatively narrow question of statutory
interpretation, not a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the
statute.52 Lopez was decided just two years after the City of Boerne
decision, at a time when the Court might not yet have appreciated
the breadth of the City of Boerne doctrine, notwithstanding Justice
Thomas’s prescient warning in dissent.53 Likewise, LULAC
prompted Justice Scalia’s embrace of section 5, but did not involve
a direct challenge to the statute, something Justice Scalia was
careful to note along with the fact that he was assuming and not
deciding the statute’s constitutionality.54
Most importantly, all the decisions from City of Boerne to
Lopez to LULAC addressed section 5 when expiration of the
statute loomed on the horizon. Indeed, Justice Scalia’s decision in
LULAC deemed compliance with section 5 a compelling state
interest at a moment when the Court was likely never again to
confront a challenge under this version of the statute. The
inclination to affirm the validity of a statute that is about to
expire may say little about one’s willingness to uphold section 5,
as recently reauthorized, for another quarter century,
particularly when the conditions that first prompted enactment
of this “temporary” statute occurred four decades ago.

50. See Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 2341, 2388 (2003).
51. Pamela S. Karlan, Lecture, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative
Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1594 (2002) (describing
the VRA as the “crown jewel of the Second Reconstruction” and suggesting that “the
Court has been unwilling to use strict scrutiny to dismantle [it]”).
52. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at *8, Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266
(1999) (No. 97-1396); Brief for Appellee Monterey County at *2–3, Lopez v. Monterey
County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (No. 97-1396); Brief for State Appellee at *10–11, Lopez v.
Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (No. 97-1396).
53. See Katz, supra note 50, at 2373.
54. LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2668 n.2 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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B. The Regulation of Congressional Elections
Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes state
legislatures to regulate congressional elections, while specifying
that “Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
55
Regulations.” For Professor Karlan, this grant of authority
“reinforc[es]” the validity of section 5.56 While the preclearance
regime is typically understood as an exercise of congressional
power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,57
Professor Karlan argues that Congress also exercised its power
under the Elections Clause when it reauthorized section 5, at
least insofar as the preclearance process regulates elections in
which members of Congress are selected.58
This is both correct and important because, as Professor
Karlan notes, precedent suggests that congressional power under
the Elections Clause is quite broad. Professor Karlan reads this
precedent as establishing that Article I grants Congress
“essentially plenary authority”59 when it regulates congressional
elections, and that may well be right. If so, the grant of authority
provides sufficient congressional power to support many
applications of section 5. It allows for the continued application of
the preclearance process to voting changes that pertain to
congressional elections, including changes related to so-called
“mixed elections,” namely elections involving multiple offices so
long as candidates for Congress are among them.60
61
And yet, it does not reach purely local elections, the very
elections where section 5 appears to be most important.
Discriminatory practices remain more persistent at the local
level where party affiliation less effectively operates as a
62
mitigating factor. Indeed, the Department of Justice has

55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
56. See Karlan, supra note 1, at 4.
57. Id. at 10–11.
58. Id. at 17; see also Daniel P. Tokaji, Intent and Its Alternatives: Defending the
New Voting Rights Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 4, on file with
the Houston Law Review) (arguing that the Elections Clause provides an alternative
theory on which the reauthorization might be upheld).
59. Karlan, supra note 1, at 16.
60. Id. at 17 (citing In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 752 (1888)).
61. Tokaji, supra note 58 (manuscript at 26).
62. See Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 4) (noting that with regard to section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, successful challenges to local practices exceed the number of such
challenges to statewide ones); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Essay, Is Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1724 (2004)
(arguing that preclearance is no longer warranted for statewide districting plans).
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objected more often to changes proposed at the local level than to
statewide changes such as congressional redistricting plans.63
The Elections Clause consequently provides significant, but
ultimately only partial, support for the validity of
reauthorization.
C. “Political Value Judgments”
Reasonable people disagree about how to achieve what
Professor Karlan labels “political fairness” in the electoral
64
process. Elections might be structured in a number of legitimate
ways, and the Constitution provides little guidance on how to
select among them. Regulating the political process necessarily
requires that choices be made among what Professor Karlan calls
“hotly contested principles of political philosophy,” choices that
she maintains are ill-suited for judicial resolution.65 Because
Professor Karlan thinks these choices “are particularly within
66
the expertise of politicians,” she argues that courts should defer
to legislatures and, specifically, that “Congress should . . . have
more leeway to make initial choices.”67
Professor Karlan posits that reauthorization represents such
a choice. Section 5, she argues, involves the regulation of the
political process and embodies numerous “political value
judgments” that the Court lacks the ability to make. Congress
made the judgments, and Professor Karlan posits that the Court
should not displace them.68
Professor Karlan highlights one specific value judgment,
namely what is known as the Georgia v. Ashcroft “fix.” Georgia v.
Ashcroft held that Georgia could permissibly replace some
majority-minority districts with so-called “coalition” and
69
“influence” districts, and that covered jurisdictions have the

63. See Michael J. Pitts, Let’s Not Call the Whole Thing off Just Yet: A Response to
Samuel Issacharoff’s Suggestion to Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 NEB. L.
REV. 605, 612 (2005) (arguing that the greatest impact of section 5 and the VRA has been
to police voting discrimination at the local level).
64. Karlan, supra note 1, at 18–19.
65. Id. at 18.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 19.
68. Id. at 17.
69. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself?
Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1539 & n.60 (2002)
(defining and discussing coalition districts). In coalition districts, black voters need not
comprise the majority of a district’s population to be able to elect representatives of
choice, while influence districts permit minority voters to exert some sway in the electoral
process but not necessarily elect representatives of choice. Id. at 1539–40.
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discretion to select among these districting devices.70 As the
Court wrote, “Section 5 gives States the flexibility to choose one
theory of effective representation over the other.”71
Congress “fixed” Georgia v. Ashcroft when it reauthorized
section 5 by expressing its preference for one specific theory of
representation. The reauthorized statute provides that a change
that “will have the effect of diminishing the ability of” minority
voters “to elect their preferred candidates of choice denies or
abridges the right to vote” for purposes of section 5 review.72 In
other words, the amendment prevents Georgia from doing what
the Court said Georgia could do in Georgia v. Ashcroft, namely,
replace majority-minority districts, where minority voters elect
representatives of choice, with influence districts, where, by
definition, they do not.
Professor Karlan has argued that minority voters are better
served when they elect representatives of choice than when they
are only able to “influence” outcomes.73 That is, she prefers the
theory of representation Congress adopted in the reauthorized
statute better than the one Georgia implemented, but her
argument doesn’t depend on this preference. Instead, her claim is
that Congress made a choice among differing theories, and that it
has the constitutional power to do so.
I wonder. The Court in Georgia v. Ashcroft certainly claimed
it was agnostic about the theories of representation at issue in
the case and that it read section 5 as allowing states to choose
among them.74 Still, I can’t help but think that the Justices sided
with Georgia because they preferred the substantive choice
Georgia made. That is, the Justices upheld Georgia’s discretion
to replace majority-minority districts with influence districts
because the Justices think that latter form of representation is
better policy. Several Justices have expressly said so,75 and some

70.
See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 480 (2003) (noting that, as between
majority-minority and coalition districts, “[s]ection 5 does not dictate that a State must
pick one of these methods of redistricting over another”); id. at 483 (finding that “[s]ection
5 leaves room for States to use these types of influence and coalitional districts . . . . [and
that] the State’s choice ultimately may rest on a political choice of whether substantive or
descriptive representation is preferable”).
71. Id. at 482.
72. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577,
580–81 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c).
73. See Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of
Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21, 31–32 (2004).
74. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 480–82.
75. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995) (“[E]qual opportunity to
gain public office regardless of race . . . is neither assured nor well served . . . by carving

(2)KATZ.DOC

2007]

3/20/2007 4:08 PM

RESPONSE TO KARLAN

49

have suggested that majority-minority districts themselves may
be unlawful.76 Indeed, language in Georgia v. Ashcroft itself
reflects the Court’s continuing discomfort with the majority77
minority district as a form of representation.
If that’s right, the Court’s willingness to uphold Georgia’s
decision to replace majority-minority districts with influence
districts doesn’t necessarily mean that the Justices would have
sustained a decision to move in the opposite direction. It does not
mean that the Court will necessarily agree that Congress has the
discretion to select the specific theory of representation that it
did when it attempted the Georgia v. Ashcroft “fix.”
But even if the Court finds that congressional power to make
“political value judgments” is sufficient to sustain this statutory
amendment, will it think such power supports the preclearance
regime more generally? Reauthorization does not simply block
covered jurisdictions from reducing the number of majorityminority districts in the manner that Georgia did. Instead, it
retains the entire preclearance apparatus and continues section
5’s burden-shifting process under which the presumption of
validity that typically attaches to state and local decisionmaking
is reversed.
In one sense, of course, Congress’s decision to continue this
regime reflects a “political value judgment”—the judgment that
electorates into racial blocs.”); id. at 911–12 (“When the State assigns voters on the basis
of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular
race, because of their race, ‘think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer
the same candidates at the polls.’” (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)));
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (recognizing that majority-minority
districts may “sometimes” be necessary “to ensure equal political and electoral
opportunity,” but emphasizing that such districts embody the “‘politics of second best,’”
and should be avoided whenever diverse ethnic and racial coalitions are possible); Holder
v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892, 892–907 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that
majority-minority districts represent “racial ‘balkanization’ of the Nation,” that they
“segregat[e] the races into political homelands that amount[], in truth, to nothing short of
a system of ‘political apartheid,’” that they give “credence to the view that race defines
political interest,” and that “few devices could be better designed to exacerbate racial
tensions than the consciously segregated districting system currently being constructed in
the name of the Voting Rights Act” (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647, 657)); see also Richard
H. Pildes, Diffusion of Political Power and the Voting Rights Act, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 119, 121 (2000) (describing the position that self-conscious creation of majorityminority districts “expresses a view of political identity inconsistent with democratic
ideals . . . . [and] might have the consequentialist effect of encouraging citizens and
representatives increasingly to come to experience and define their political identities and
interests in partial terms”).
76. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 36, at 801 (stating that “a majority of the
majority [in the Shaw cases] regards the intentional creation of [a majority-minority
district] as presumptively unconstitutional” but that a majority of the full Court does not).
77. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 487. But see LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594,
2616, 2622 (2006).
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the procedures the regime mandates remain necessary. Still, it
strikes me as a value judgment of a different order than the
specific substantive choice Congress made in response to Georgia
v. Ashcroft. If preclearance in its entirety constitutes a political
value judgment to which the Court should defer, the
expansiveness of the category strips it of analytic power. No
longer a reason to defer to congressional power, the need for a
political value judgment constitutes nothing more than the
conclusion that deference is required. In this light, the factor
simply restates the general claim that power here should be
plenary without advancing the case for why it might be.
D. Exercising “Political Responsibility”
The final component of Professor Karlan’s argument rests on
her characterization of the preclearance regime as “a
quintessential exercise of political responsibility.”78 This matters,
Professor Karlan suggests, because she maintains that the
animating force within much of the City of Boerne doctrine and
the Court’s federalism jurisprudence generally is the belief that
the federal government should own up to measures that erode
state sovereignty and not a broader concern for protecting state
sovereignty itself.79 Because Professor Karlan believes that
preclearance manifests the requisite federal assumption of
political responsibility, she argues the federalism decisions do not
affect the validity of reauthorization.
That’s a provocative and interesting claim, but again, I’m not
convinced that the Court will agree nor that it should. To be sure,
the Court has made clear that the concerns propelling its
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence are not implicated when
Congress authorizes the federal government (as opposed to a
80
private party) to initiate litigation against a state defendant. It
has also suggested (albeit less explicitly) that these concerns
were at issue in many of the City of Boerne decisions, which
involved congressional efforts to abrogate state immunity from
81
suit under the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the Court has
indeed flatly rejected federal measures that blur lines of political

78. Karlan, supra note 1, at 19.
79. Id. at 11.
80. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755–56 (1999).
81. In decisions like Kimel, Florida Prepaid, and Garrett, the Court refused to allow
Congress to circumvent decisions like Seminole Tribe of Florida through an expansive use
of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 67 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 630 (1999); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).

(2)KATZ.DOC

2007]

3/20/2007 4:08 PM

RESPONSE TO KARLAN

51

responsibility and emphasized the need for the federal
government to assume responsibility for the measures it
initiates.82
Far less clear is whether any of this informs the validity of
the section 5 preclearance regime. The assumption of political
responsibility as described by Professor Karlan is hardly a
necessary condition for a statute’s survival.83 That it might be
sufficient (or at least sufficient when combined with independent
factors of the sort Professor Karlan lists) is, I suppose, possible.
It’s also possible that the Court believes that the need to assume
political responsibility is but one value that inheres in its vast
federalism jurisprudence. Congress may well circumvent the
rules applying the Eleventh Amendment by assuming political
responsibility for the measures it promotes. But that power does
not necessarily mean it can get around all the strictures
embodied in federalism case law simply by assuming such
responsibility. In other words, additional values limit
congressional power in this realm.
Nor is it clear to me that preclearance reflects an
assumption of responsibility of the sort or scope Professor Karlan
suggests. She is, of course, correct that judicial preclearance (that
is, when states seek preclearance in federal district court) “raises
none of the specific concerns that the abrogation cases involve,
84
since it does not implicate the Eleventh Amendment.” The State
is by definition the plaintiff, and thus is not being subjected to
suit. As important, the Attorney General’s response as a
defendant in such suits necessarily manifests an exercise of
responsibility, either by rebutting the claims made by the
covered jurisdiction or by acquiescing to them.85
So too, political responsibility is plausibly exercised within
the administrative preclearance process where the vast majority
86
of preclearance requests are submitted. The Attorney General
assumes such responsibility when he interposes an objection to a
82. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
83. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533 (2004) (upholding the FMLA’s
authorization of private suits against state agencies); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003) (upholding ADA’s authorization of private suits against state
agencies).
84. Karlan, supra note 1, at 19.
85. See id. at 20.
86. See Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Department, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 52, 53 n.2 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson
eds., 1992) (citing Justice Department statistics); Hiroshi Motomura, Preclearance Under
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61 N.C. L. REV. 189, 191 (1983) (citing the “expense
and delay involved in a declaratory judgment action” as primary reasons most
jurisdictions seek preclearance from the Attorney General).
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proposed change, and other agency actors at least arguably do so
as well when they take actions that slow state decision-making or
indeed functionally block choices a State would otherwise make.87
And yet, section 5 imposes its biggest burden by requiring
covered jurisdictions to submit changes for preclearance
(regardless of how the Department of Justice responds to
submissions). It is this obligation that is far more difficult to
characterize as an exercise of political responsibility of the sort
Professor Karlan references. To be sure, through the original
coverage formulas set forth in the VRA and the reauthorizations
that followed, Congress decided that covered jurisdictions should
bear the burden to submit electoral changes, regardless of their
individual merits, and defend their legitimacy. But if Congress’s
determination that preclearance was needed and remains
necessary represents an exercise of political responsibility, then
any legislative act would presumably qualify as well.
That hardly renders reauthorization suspect. It simply
means that the exercise of responsibility the statute reflects does
not ensure its survival.
III. A THIRD APPROACH
Most proponents of preclearance parse the congressional
record for documented evidence of misconduct in covered
jurisdictions and defend section 5 as a congruent and
proportional remedy under the City of Boerne standard,
understood either in its most rigorous form or under the less
exacting approach set forth in Hibbs and Lane.88 Professor
Karlan, by contrast, posits a vision of congressional power that
allows Congress to renew preclearance regardless of whether the
new statute comports with the cramped standards set forth in
City of Boerne and its progeny.
In this part, I suggest a third approach to assess the validity
of reauthorization. I do not believe the scope of unconstitutional
conduct in covered jurisdictions can help us gauge the need for
renewal, given that section 5 presently operates to block such
89
conduct. And yet, I don’t think Congress enjoys so much power
that its decision to renew preclearance becomes functionally
87. See, e.g., Luis Ricardo Fraga & Maria Lizet Ocampo, The Deterrent Effect of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Role of More Information Requests, in DEMOCRACY,
PARTICIPATION AND POWER: PERSPECTIVES ON REAUTHORIZATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 8, on file with the Houston Law Review), available at
http://www.ucdc.edu/faculty/Voting_Rights/Papers/5%20-%20Fraga%20&%20Ocampo.pdf.
88. See supra notes 8, 23–25 and accompanying text.
89. See supra text accompanying note 5.
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unreviewable. The City of Boerne cases have been widely
criticized,90 but they nevertheless rest on the important intuition
that congressional power to enforce the Reconstruction
Amendments is not wholly unbounded. My view is that this
intuition applies to reauthorization as well, both as a normative
matter and as a predictive judgment of what the Court will do.
A. Reauthorizing Existing Statutes Under City of Boerne
The City of Boerne decisions articulate ways to limit
Congress’s enforcement powers, with the need for a supporting
record of unconstitutional conduct being the most prominent. The
need for such a record, however, makes little sense when
evaluating an operational statute such as section 5. After all,
such a requirement would allow Congress to reauthorize the
preclearance regime only if it were an utterly unsuccessful means
to combat discrimination.
But if the scope of unconstitutional conduct cannot help us
evaluate Congress’s determination that preclearance remains
necessary, how can we assess Congress’s judgment that the world
has yet to change so much that section 5 might be eliminated
without serious adverse consequence?
My view is that the City of Boerne standard of review
remains applicable to reauthorization—that is, the reauthorized
statute must exhibit “congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
91
that end” —but that application of this standard must be
adjusted to reflect the status of section 5 as an operational
statute. Reauthorization should not be seen to address
contemporary unconstitutional conduct of debatable scope.
Instead, reauthorization should be understood to target political
processes that continue to be compromised by race, compromised
in ways that reflect past misconduct and that portend future
misconduct absent the statute’s renewal. In my view, Congress
may legitimately target political processes compromised in this
manner, and may do so through the means it selected when it
renewed section 5, namely, with a remedial regime that is
intrusive but also circumscribed in critical respects.

90. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is a
Constitutional Expansion of Rights, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 601, 602–04 (1998); Ruth
Colker, The Supreme Court's Historical Errors in City of Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV.
783, 791–93 (2002); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Essay, Equal Protection by Law:
Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 455
(2000).
91. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
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More specifically, racial considerations may compromise a
political process in ways that do not rise to a constitutional
violation. Voting may be polarized along racial lines and
campaigns marked by racial appeals. Historic discrimination
both in voting and other realms may hinder contemporary
political participation, quantitatively in terms of voter
registration and turnout, and more qualitatively, by, for instance,
hindering cross-racial alliances and fundraising efforts,
92
particularly in environments that are racially segregated.
Elected officials may be nonresponsive to minority residents, and
minority candidates may have little hope of mounting a
successful campaign.93
None of this, of course, necessarily matters under
conventional City of Boerne analysis, which cares little about
behavior that does not rise to the level of unconstitutional
conduct. In my view, however, such evidence critically informs
the validity of reauthorization. It reveals an environment in
which race remains salient in problematic ways, ways that
compromise rather than foster the emergence of a truly healthy
and vibrant political community. It signals that the vestiges of
past discrimination have not been adequately remedied and it
portends future discrimination stemming from contemporary
limits on full participation. In short, it describes an environment
in which federal measures protecting voting rights remain
justified.
The Supreme Court has so recognized, or, more precisely,
affirmed Congress’s power to make this determination in a series
of decisions dating back to Reconstruction.94 The modern
articulation of the principle is found in Katzenbach v. Morgan,
which upheld the ban on literacy tests set forth in section 4(e) of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, because such tests excluded
members of New York City’s Puerto Rican community from
casting a ballot.95 The concern was both that the tests themselves
were the product of prohibited discrimination and that the use of
96
such tests fostered “discrimination in governmental services.”
Morgan recognizes congressional power to ban this literacy test
both as a remedy for past discrimination and also to protect the

92. See Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 23).
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 661–62 (1884) (recognizing
Congress’s power to protect voting interests in the famous Ku Klux cases); see also Katz,
supra note 50, at 2343.
95. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1966).
96. Id. at 653.

(2)KATZ.DOC

2007]

3/20/2007 4:08 PM

RESPONSE TO KARLAN

55

people the test excluded from future governmental
discrimination.97 Morgan posits that people denied access to the
franchise are more likely to confront such discrimination, and
accordingly upholds congressional power to enact section 4(e)
because doing so “enhanced political power [that] will be helpful
in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services for the
98
entire Puerto Rican community.”
City of Boerne, of course, rejected the most famous
proposition associated with Morgan, specifically, the suggestion
that Congress may enact legislation that “expands” rights
99
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Boerne,
however, assiduously affirmed the two core rationales for
Morgan’s holding, namely, congressional power to ban New
York’s English literacy test as a remedial measure for official
100
discrimination in establishing voter qualification,
and
congressional power to ban the test as a mechanism to address
future discrimination in public services.101
That’s all well and good as far as it goes. But a problem
remains if the Court wants to use this framework to uphold
reauthorization as both a remedial measure and a measure to
block future discrimination. Congressional power, as described in
Morgan and affirmed in City of Boerne, is functionally
unbounded. A truly healthy political community, one where race
unites us only in positive ways, is something we are unlikely to
witness in our lifetimes. Vestiges of discrimination persist, and
will very likely always persist. We will continually be able to
collect evidence showing the ways race affects the political
process in problematic ways, and we can be sure that the threat
of future misconduct will never fully abate.
If that admittedly gloomy prediction is right, how does it
inform the validity of reauthorization? To what extent can
Congress address the vestiges of past discrimination and block
future misconduct and still exercise a power of circumscribed
dimension? Put differently, how will we know when enough is
enough?

97. Id. at 653–56.
98. Id. at 652.
99. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527–28 (1997) (noting language in
Morgan that “could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact
legislation that expands the rights contained in [Section] 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment,” and finding that “[a]ny suggestion that Congress has a substantive, nonremedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law”).
100. See id. at 528; Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654.
101. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528; see also Katz, supra note 50, at 2395–96.
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That is a tough question, but one about which we need not
speculate in a vacuum. The statute as reauthorized includes
within its criteria, set by Congress itself, a mechanism to predict
the likelihood of future misconduct absent section 5. That is, it
contains criteria to measure the very question reauthorization
presents.
B. The Centrality of Bailout
Reauthorization rests on the view that the world has not
changed enough, and that the problems that originally propelled
Congress to enact section 5 have not been adequately remedied.
But the statute as framed allows for the possibility that this
judgment is mistaken or might become so with time. Covered
jurisdictions may escape from the obligation to obtain
preclearance if they demonstrate their eligibility for what is
commonly known as bailout.102 Covered jurisdictions can lose the
“covered” designation and thereby free themselves of the
preclearance requirement if they demonstrate their compliance
with specific statutory criteria.103
As originally formulated, bailout was only available to
jurisdictions that had not employed a discriminatory test or
device for a designated period that Congress kept calibrated to
the enactment of the section 5 regime in 1965. This requirement
meant most covered jurisdictions were wholly ineligible for
104
bailout, and that consequence was intended. Bailout was meant
to exempt from preclearance those regions that found themselves
covered under the original “trigger” or coverage formula but, due
to the imprecision with that trigger, should not have been
105
subjected to the preclearance requirement. Jurisdictions able to
bailout during this period may have employed a test or device in
a nondiscriminatory fashion, or, after 1975, used English-only
ballot materials in a region where members of the resident
qualifying foreign language minority population were fluent in
English.106
102. See Paul F. Hancock & Lora L. Tredway, The Bailout Standard of the Voting
Rights Act: An Incentive to End Discrimination, 17 URB. LAW. 379, 380 (1985).
103. Id. at 409–11.
104. Id. at 381 (“Thus, prior to the 1982 amendments, jurisdictions that had
historically discriminated in the electoral process could not realistically expect to bail out
until a fixed calendar date arrived.”).
105. Id. at 391–92 & n.62 (citing text of House Report which acknowledges that some
jurisdictions might be covered yet have no record of discrimination in “registering voters
or conducting elections”).
106. See J. Gerald Hebert, An Assessment of the Bailout Provisions of The Voting
Rights Act, in DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION AND POWER: PERSPECTIVES ON
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Congress amended the bailout standard in 1982 to excuse
jurisdictions from preclearance even if they were properly
covered in the first instance. The change reflected the view that
section 5, overall, remained necessary due to “continuing
problems of discrimination and widespread failure to comply
107
with the Voting Rights Act in the covered jurisdictions.” It also
reflected Congress’s judgment that some jurisdictions might have
made sufficient progress to justify excusing them from further
obligations under section 5.108 Rather than attempting to identify
these jurisdictions one by one, Congress opted instead to create a
mechanism under which jurisdictions come forward with
evidence to adjust on a case-by-case basis Congress’s
109
presumptive judgment that section 5 remains necessary.
Congress retained this version of bailout when it reauthorized
preclearance in 2006.
As presently formulated, the bailout provision informs the
validity of reauthorization in several respects. First, it sets forth
substantive criteria designed to gauge whether section 5
obligations may be lifted without adverse consequence. The
bailout criteria do not focus exclusively, or even primarily, on
constitutional violations, although intentionally discriminatory
conduct related to voting renders a covered jurisdiction ineligible
for bailout.110 Instead, the bailout provision seeks to measure the
health of minority political participation in the jurisdiction, the
implication being that where such participation is sufficiently
vibrant, minority voters can ably protect themselves absent the
111
strictures of section 5.

REAUTHORIZATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 4–6, on
file with Author), available at http://www.ucdc.edu/faculty/Voting_Rights/Papers/9%20%20Hebert.pdf (tracing the history of the bailout provision from original enactment).
107. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 44 (1982).
108. See Winke, supra note 8, at 111 (recognizing that the 1982 bailout provision
opened the door for covered jurisdictions that have sufficiently remedied voting
discrimination to be exempted).
109. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 45–46 (1982) (discussing the proposed—and subsequently
passed—committee bill that allowed individual jurisdictions to come forward with
evidence of progress with regards to voting discrimination).
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(3) (2000) (“No declaratory judgment shall issue under
this subsection . . . if such plaintiff . . . during the period beginning ten years before the
date the judgment is issued, engaged in violations . . . unless the plaintiff establishes that
any such violations were trivial, were promptly corrected, and were not repeated.”).
111. See Timothy G. O’Rourke, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982: The New
Bailout Provision and Virginia, 69 VA. L. REV. 765, 782 (1983) (stating broadly that the
bailout provisions require “a jurisdiction [to] demonstrate a record of compliance with the
Act over the previous ten years, and [to] show that it has taken positive steps both to
encourage minority political participation and to remove structural barriers to minority
electoral influence”).
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More specifically, the bailout standard inquires whether the
jurisdiction has complied with section 5, both in terms of the
timely submission of proposed changes and actual objections
interposed by the Attorney General; whether it required the
presence of federal officials to monitor registration or to observe
elections; whether the jurisdiction violated section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act or related statutory proscriptions, or entered a
consent decree in litigation that might have so established; and
whether the jurisdiction eliminated obstacles to equal political
participation and made affirmative efforts to expand minority
participation, by for instance, working to end voter harassment,
to expand voter registration, and to appoint minority election
112
officials.
113
Because very few jurisdictions have bailed out since 1982,
114
some say that the bailout criteria are too difficult. And yet,
jurisdictions that have attempted to do so typically succeed,115
suggesting that more might free themselves from coverage were
116
they simply to try to navigate the process. Indeed, the criteria
may well be too lenient given that the factors fail to capture a
host of problems that might hinder minority political
participation and thus arguably make exemption from section 5
premature. For example, judicial findings made in litigation
under section 2 of the VRA provide important details about

112. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2000). In summary, the statute holds that a
jurisdiction can escape coverage if it can establish that, in the last ten years, it:
(1) has not used a discriminatory test or device in the electoral process that has the
purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote based on race or membership in
designated language minorities;
(2) has not been found by a federal court to have denied or abridged the right to vote
based on race or other protected statute, and has not been party to a consent decree or
settlement ending such litigation;
(3) has not required the presence of federal officials to register voters or observe elections;
(4) has fully complied with section 5, including submitting all changes; and
(5) has eliminated voting procedures which inhibit or dilute equal access; engaged in
constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment of voters; and engaged in
other constructive efforts, such as expanding opportunities for convenient registration
and the appointment of minorities as election officials. Id.
113. See Hebert, supra note 106 (manuscript at 20).
114. See Richard A. Williamson, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A
Statutory Analysis of the Revised Bailout Provisions, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 42 (1984)
(arguing that while “bailout rules have been liberalized in theory . . . the conditions for
termination of coverage have been made so restrictive that bailout will continue to be
impossible for most jurisdictions”); cf. Winke, supra note 8, at 72 (describing the bailout
standard as “strict” but appropriate).
115. See Hebert, supra note 106 (manuscript at 2) (claiming the standards for bailout
“have proven to be both workable and practical”).
116. But cf. O’Rourke, supra note 111, at 98 (discussing costs of attempting bailout
and failing).
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political participation in defendant jurisdictions.117 Cases in
which statutory violations are found or consent decrees are
entered signal problems with minority political participation in
the jurisdiction. But using litigation of this sort as a lens through
which to observe such problems necessarily means that a good
deal of problematic conduct will escape detection, either because
lawsuits were not filed or litigation was not pursued to finality.118
Bailout might have been made contingent on a greater
119
showing, and different criteria might also do the job. Still, the
provision as crafted is important—and indeed so important that
it should provide the measure under which reauthorization is
reviewed—because it sets forth Congress’s definition of when
enough is enough. It strikes the balance Congress thought
appropriate and sensible when it acted in an environment of
necessary uncertainty, and it confronted the obligation to make a
judgment about that uncertainty. Under this balance, neither the
absence of pervasive unconstitutional conduct is sufficient for
bailout, nor is the elimination of all vestiges of past
discrimination required.
In this sense, the bailout criteria parallel the standard the
Court has developed to gauge whether a school district should be
120
Districts achieve
released from a desegregation decree.
“unitary” status, the Court has held, through a combination of
good faith compliance with the decree and the elimination of
“vestiges of past discrimination” to the extent practicable.121 The
bailout provision similarly looks at good faith by checking
whether the jurisdiction has made timely submissions for
preclearance, and, through the mix of other factors, requires not
the complete elimination of all vestiges of discrimination, but
instead a reasonable effort in this regard.122

117. See Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 3); see also Ellen Katz et al., Documenting
Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 654–62 (2006).
118. See generally Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 25).
119. Congress allows counties within covered jurisdictions to bailout independently,
but a host of governmental entities within counties cannot, unless the county or the state
as a whole seeks bailout. A pending challenge to reauthorization insists that Congress’s
failure to allow subcounty units to bailout renders the statute constitutionally suspect.
See generally Complaint, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Gonzales, No. 1:06-cv01384 (D.C.C. filed Aug. 4, 2006), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
mudgonzalescomplaint.pdf.
120. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88–89 (1995) (setting forth the standards
to gauge whether a school district should be released from a desegregation decree).
121. Id. at 89 (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492 (1992)).
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2000).
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Of course, the analogy between the preclearance regime and
school desegregation decree is far from complete and important
123
differences exist. Still, section 5’s remedial regime resembles a
desegregation decree in that it was imposed to address specified,
unconstitutional conduct, it was not intended to operate in
perpetuity, and it functions in a context in which local control is
highly valued. While I think the standards for relief from both
are too lenient,124 the similarities between the two suggest that
the balance Congress reached in framing the bailout standard is
neither unprecedented nor irresponsible.
The bailout provision, moreover, does not simply define
circumstances that justify releasing individual jurisdictions from
the preclearance requirement. It also offers a lens through which
to gauge how Congress viewed the record before it when it
reauthorized preclearance. Had Congress declined to reauthorize
preclearance entirely or, more narrowly, chosen to exempt
particular covered jurisdictions from the preclearance obligation,
it would, for all practical purposes, have “bailed out” the
jurisdictions involved. Congress opted to reauthorizate the
statute and retain the bailout provision, and thereby suggested
its belief that covered jurisdictions were not yet in sufficient
compliance with the bailout criteria to be freed from the section 5
obligations.
The record underlying reauthorization supports this judgment
and suggests widespread noncompliance with the bailout criteria.125
Congress collected evidence documenting hundreds of examples of
apparently unconstitutional conduct by public officials in covered
jurisdictions,126 dozens of instances in which federal officials have
127
a
been sent to covered jurisdictions to monitor elections;
123. Compare Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 88–89 (setting forth the standards to gauge
whether a school district should be released from a desegregation decree), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(a)(1) (2000) (setting forth the standards for the bailout provision).
124. See David S. Tatel, Judicial Methodology, Southern School Desegregation, and
the Rule of Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1071, 1115 (2004) (arguing that relief from
desegregation decrees may be too easy to achieve).
125. See generally Katz, supra note 5 ; Katz et al., supra note 117, at 654–61.
126. Katz et al., supra note 117, at 678–85; see also Peyton McCrary, Christopher
Seaman & Richard Valelly, The End of Preclearance as We Knew It: How the Supreme
Court Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 275, 292–99
(2006) (finding that the preclearance process has repeatedly blocked proposed electoral
changes based on evidence of bad intent).
127. Voting Rights Act: Sections 6 and 8—The Federal Examiner and Observer
Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 47 (2005) (statement of Barry H. Weinberg, former Deputy Chief
of the Voting Rights Division, Department of Justice); id. at 63 (statement of Rep. John
Conyers, Jr.); id. at 195 (statement of Bradley J. Schlozman, Principal Deputy Assistant
Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice); id. at 264 (Letter from William
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widespread failure of covered jurisdictions to make timely
submission of their proposed changes, and 627 objections interposed
since 1982,128 albeit at a declining rate in recent years; 129
constructive efforts by covered jurisdictions to increase minority
registration and turnout,130 but also evidence indicating that
minority participation continues to lag in many areas, that covered
jurisdictions continue to employ dilutive electoral devices, and that,
in many places, minority voters continue to face harassment in
seeking to register and vote.131 The record documented that, since
1982, federal courts reached outcomes favorable to plaintiffs in
sixty-eight published decisions involving a section 2 claim brought
against a covered jurisdiction.132
Congress’s decision to reauthorize section 5 based on this
record embodies the judgment that minority political participation
in covered jurisdictions was not yet so secure as to render
preclearance obsolete. To the extent that any specific covered
jurisdiction might demonstrate otherwise now or in the coming
years, the bailout provision carves out the path for doing so.
As such, bailout informs the validity of reauthorization in an
additional respect. It clarifies the nature of the regime
reauthorization imposes.133 When Congress voted to extend
preclearance last summer, it did not conclusively bind covered
jurisdictions to the strictures of section 5 for the next quarter
century. Instead, it renewed what has been since 1982 a
rebuttable presumption that preclearance remains a necessary
remedy. And it placed on covered jurisdictions the burden to
show otherwise by demonstrating their compliance with the
statutory criteria set forth in the bailout provision.134 The
obligation to seek preclearance should accordingly be understood
not as an inexorable command but instead as a temporally and

Jenkins, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability
Office, to Sen. Joseph Lieberman, Rep. Henry Waxman, and Rep. John Conyers, Jr.).
128. Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
104–224 (2005) (appendix to statement of Bradley J. Schlozman, Acting Assistant Att’y
Gen., Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice).
129. Id. at 10 (statement of Bradley J. Schlozman, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil
Rights Division, Department of Justice).
130. Id. at 12.
131. See id. at 80–82 (statement of Anita S. Earls, Director of Advocacy, UNC Center
for Civil Rights).
132. Katz, supra note 5 (manuscript at Figure 1).
133. See Winke, supra note 8, at 111 (arguing that bailout was “required to cut the
potentially overbroad preclearance remedy down to a size congruent with the problem of
persistent racial discrimination in voting”).
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2000).
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geographically limited default regime applicable to those
jurisdictions, already held to have been properly covered in the
first instance,135 that are unable or unwilling to make their case
for bailout.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Karlan fully appreciates the complex ways race
continues to infect political processes in covered jurisdictions,
and her vigorous defense of reauthorization is propelled by her
firm conviction that gains in minority political participation are
too recent and too fragile to render preclearance obsolete.136
Professor Karlan also values the ways in which section 5 remains
a targeted and circumscribed statute. She views bailout as an
137
important component of the preclearance regime, and sees the
record underlying the statute as confirmation that the statute
remains needed.138
Professor Karlan nevertheless posits a vision of
congressional power so broad that reauthorization would stand
even if Congress acted on no record whatsoever and dispensed
with bailout entirely. Indeed, her vision would allow Congress to
make preclearance much more difficult to obtain,139 or vastly to
140
expand the types of decisions subject to preclearance. Under
Professor Karlan’s vision, Congress could make section 5
permanent, or subject the entire country to its strictures.
Congress, of course, never seriously considered enacting any
of these changes, and its refusal to do so provides support for
Professor Karlan’s claim that deference is appropriate. The
political process itself might just ensure that preclearance
remains within circumscribed bounds, or at least might police
those bounds as effectively as the Court might hope to do. But if
I’m right that Professor Karlan’s vision of congressional power
would allow Congress to expand vastly the reach of section 5, the
Roberts Court may well be uneasy with Professor Karlan’s vision.
135. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (upholding section 5
as extended in 1975); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 131–34 (1970) (upholding section
5 as extended in 1970); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966)
(upholding section 5 as enacted in 1965).
136. See generally Karlan, supra note 1, at 21–22.
137. Id. at 26–27.
138. Id. at 2–3.
139. Cf. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1997) (holding that a
violation of section 2 of the VRA is not grounds to deny preclearance under section 5).
140. Cf. Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 509 (1992) (holding that
changes in the allocation of power among elected officials are not changes “with respect to
voting” subject to preclearance under section 5 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2000))).
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If the Justices aren’t wholly convinced that Congress enjoys
as much power as Professor Karlan thinks, we should remind
them that Professor Karlan has offered us more than is needed to
sustain the statute that was authorized. Reauthorization targets
political processes that remain compromised by race,
compromised in ways that reflect past discrimination and
portend future misconduct. As such, it targets electoral practices
of the sort that the Court has held fall within congressional
power to regulate. It does so through a remedial regime that is
circumscribed—geographically,
temporally,
through
the
rebuttable presumption the bailout provision embodies, and the
detailed record that underlies it.
Indeed, the ways in which the preclearance regime remains
circumscribed may well prove critical to its survival precisely
because the Roberts Court may be more comfortable with the
amount of power reauthorization of this statute requires.
Sometimes just enough is plenty.

